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1. Introduction 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a wireless technology that uses radio signals to 
identify objects automatically and remotely. The most popular tags are passive devices 
owing to their low cost. Nowadays, RFID devices are widely deployed in many 
applications, such as supply chain management, inventory control, contactless credit card 
and so on, due to the low-cost and convenience in identifying objects with non-line-of sight 
reading, However, there are many potential security threats around the tiny RFID tags 
attached to users. The carrying items or privacy information contained in these tags might 
be compromised. Furthermore, low-cost makes these tags very resource-limited, which 
makes it very challenging to design secure protocols for these tags.  
From the point of end user’s side, a secure RFID system should provide the capability of 
location/content privacy protection, anonymity, untraceability and availability [2]. Several 
RFID lightweight authentication protocols like [4-10] have been developed, but not all of 
them satisfy all the security requirements. All the previously proposed protocols are 
designed to be computationally secure, i.e., the security depends on the hardness of solving 
mathematical problem. Recently, Alomair et al. [1] proposed an unconditionally secure 
lightweight RFID (UCS-RFID for short) protocol, and claimed that their protocol achieved 
unconditional secrecy and unconditionally integrity. The security of the UCS-RFID protocol 
depends on the freshness of the keys. However, the UCS-RFID protocol does not achieve 
backward untraceability, even though it does achieve forward untractability. 
Forward and backward untraceability are important privacy properties for RFID 
authentication protocol [4]. Forward untraceability requires that even if the adversary 
reveals the internal state of a tag at time τ, the adversary still cannot know whether a 
transaction after time τ + δ (for some δ > 0) involves the same tag or not, provided that the 
adversary does not eavesdrop on the tag continuously after time τ. Backward untraceability 
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requires that even if the adversary reveals the internal state of a tag at time τ, the adversary 
is not able to tell whether a transaction before time τ involves the same tag or not [3]. These 
two properties are important for the RFID systems that the equipped tags are low-cost and 
potentially prone to being captured and compromised.  
 
 Notation Description 
R  RFID reader 
i
T  i-th RFID tag 
S  Back-end database 
p  A 2N-bit prime integer, where N is ….. 
p
Z  The finite integer ring with usual addition and multiplication modulo p  
*
p
Z  
The multiplicative group modulo p, *
p
Z  contains all non-zero elements of
p
Z ; that 
is, * \{0}
p p
Z Z  
( )mn  
n denotes a 2N-bit random number which is drawn uniformly from the *
p
Z , m
denotes that it is used in the m-th session 
( )m
l
n  The left N most significant bits of ( )mn  
( )m
r
n  The right N least significant bits of ( )mn  
( )m
i
K  
The secret keys of the RFID tag iT  . They consist of five subkeys, i.e., 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ,  ,  ,  ,  )m m m m m m
i a i b i c i d i e i
K k k k k k . The superscript m denotes the m-th run, and the 
subscript i denote the i–th tag 
i
T . 
(0 )
a i
k  A subkey which is initially drawn independently and uniformly from 
2N
Z   
(0 )
b i
k  A subkey which is initially drawn uniformly from pZ  
(0 )
c i
k  A subkey which is initially drawn independently and uniformly from *pZ  
(0 )
d i
k  A subkey which is initially drawn independently and uniformly from 
2N
Z   
(0 )
e i
k  
A subkey which is initially drawn independently and uniformly from *
p
Z  that 
will be used for updating the secret keys to maintain certain properties 
Table 1. Notations or Symbols 
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In this book chapter, we first examine the USC-RFID protocol, and show that the USC-RFID 
protocol does not achieve backward untraceability. After that, we will extend the USC-RFID 
protocol to an enforced one with untraceability. 
2. The UCS-RFID protocol 
The UCS-RFID procotol [1] is a lightweight RFID authentication protocol and is the first 
RFID protocol providing unconditional security for low-cost tags. The UCS-RFID protocol 
has the merits that it does not require tags to support random number generation and it 
requires only one simple multiplication on tags. The security of this protocol mainly relies 
on the RFID reader’s capability to deliver random numbers to RFID tags in an authenticated 
and secure way.  
The UCS-RFID protocol consists of four phases: the tag identification phase, the reader 
authentication phase, the tag authentication phase, and the key updating phase (see Fig. 1 
for more details). For the convenience of describing the UCS-RFID protocol, we first 
introduce the notations or symbols shown in Table 1. Initially, each tag Ti has a secret key 
set (0 )
i
K shared with the back-end database. In the following, we describe the m-th run of the 
protocol. 
Tag identification phase 
i. The reader R sends a Hello message to the tag Ti. 
ii. Ti sends its message A(m) to R, and R forwards this message ( )miA to the back-end 
database S. 
iii. S looks up the database for the secret key ( )m
i
K corresponding to the message ( )m
i
A . If the 
( )m
i
A could be identified as a valid identifier, then S sends back the tag’s secret key ( )m
i
K to 
R. Otherwise, the tag Ti is rejected. 
Reader Authentication Phase 
i. R generates a random number ( )mn , computes ( ) ( ) ( )  mod  m m m
ib
B n k p   and 
( ) ( ) ( )  mod  m m m
ic
C n k p  , and then sends these two messages (B(m), C(m)) to Ti. 
ii. After receiving B(m) and C(m), Ti extracts 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) mod  m m m
ib
n B k p  , and then verifies its 
integrity via checking whether the equation ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )  mod  m m m m
i ib c
B k k C p    holds. If so, 
R is authenticated; otherwise, the tag aborts the protocol. 
Tag Authentication Phase 
i. Ti computes
( ) ( ) ( )  m m m
il d
D n k  and returns this value. 
ii. After receiving the value, R verifies whether the equation 
?
( ) ( ) ( )  m m m
il d
D n k   
holds. If so, the tag is authenticated; Otherwise, the tag is rejected. 
Key Updating Phase: After a successful mutual authentication between the tag and the 
reader, the secret key and the tag identifier are updated at the back-end database and the tag 
respectively as specified in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 depicts the protocol for the m-th run.  
The above protocol cannot deter possible denial-of-service attacks (DOS attacks), and Alomair 
et al. had extended the above protocol to prevent DOS attacks and possible key exposure 
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problem. Since these extensions are not relevant to our improvements, we will not discuss 
these parts for easy presentation, and interested readers are referred to [1] for details.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The UCS-RFID protocol. 
3. Extending the USC-RFID to untraceability 
In Section 3.1, we examine the untraceability of the USC-RFID protocol, and then provide an 
improved scheme to enhance its untraceability.  
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3.1 Untraceability of the UCS-RFID protocol 
Here we show that the UCS-RFID protocol does not provide backward untraceability as 
follows.  
 Suppose the tag Ti has been compromised and the internal secrets 
( ) ( 1) ( )  mod  2m m m N
l a i
A n k   and ( )m
i
K =( ( )m
a i
k , ( )m
b i
k , ( )m
c i
k , ( )m
d i
k , ( )m
e i
k ) are revealed at time τ. Let 
(A, B, C, D) be one eavesdropped message. Then we can tell whether the message (A, B, C, 
D) comes from the same tag or not as follows.  
1. Derive ( 1) ( ) ( )  mod  2m m m N
l a i
n A k   . 
2. Derive ( 1) ( 1)m m
id l
k D n   , ( 1) ( ) ( 1)m m m
r d i d i
n k k    and ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)||m m m
l r
n n n   .  
3. Now we can derive the previous internal state ( 1)1 m(m ) (m)
a i a ir
k n k   , 
( 1)1 -1( )  mod m(m ) (m)
e i e i
k k n p   , ( 1)1 1( mod )  m(m ) (m) (m )
b i b i e i
k k k p n     , 
( 1)1 1 1( ( ) mod ) m(m ) (m) (m )
c i c i e i
k k k p n       and ( 1)1 m(m ) (m)
d i r d i
k n k   .  
4. Now we check whether the two equations 
?
( 1) ( 1)  mod  m m
ib
B n k p    and 
?
( 1) ( 1)  mod  m m
ic
C n k p    hold. It is obvious that if the two equations hold, then the 
message (A, B, C, D) is the ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( , , , )m m m mA B C D     from the compromised tag.  
We can recursively apply the above steps to trace the messages from the same tag for i-
th run, where 1i m  . That is, the USC-RFID protocol cannot provide backward 
untraceability.  
Even though the USC-RFID protocol does not satisfy backward untraceability, it does 
provide forward untraceability. This is because, in forward untraceability, if the adversary 
reveals the internal state of a tag at time τ, it is required that the adversary does not 
eavesdrop on the tag continuously after time τ. It is this break of eavesdropping that makes 
the USC-RFID satisfy forward untraceability.  
3.2 Enhancing the untraceability 
The key to find the link in our backward traceability is that the equation 
( ) ( 1) ( )  mod  2m m m N
l a i
A n k   contains only one unknown value ( 1)m
l
n   when the adversary learn 
the internal state ( )mA  and ( )m
i
K =( ( )m
a i
k , ( )m
b i
k , ( )m
c i
k , ( )m
d i
k , ( )m
e i
k ); therefore, the adversary can 
derive ( 1) ( ) ( )  mod  2m m m N
l a i
n A k    and the other values accordingly. We also notice that each 
of the other key updating equations in the key updating phase contains at least two 
unknown values. Therefore, we can amend the protocol by simply modifying this equation 
( ) ( 1) ( )  mod  2m m m N
l a i
A n k   to contain two unknowns. One simple suggestion is 
that ( ) ( 1) ( 1)  mod  2m m m N
l a i
A n k   . With this modification, the adversary should solve two 
unknowns in each equation to derive the secret even assume he has learned the current state 
( ( )mA , ( )m
a i
k , ( )m
b i
k , ( )m
c i
k , ( )m
d i
k , ( )m
e i
k ). It, therefore, cannot provide adversaries a unique and 
deterministic link to trace the tag.  
4. Conclusion 
In this book chapter, we have shown that the UCS-RFID protocol which is the first 
unconditionally secure mutual authentication protocol for RFID systems cannot satisfy 
backward untraceability, and we have proposed a simple amendment to enhance its 
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backward untraceability. The unconditional secure RFID protocol is very promising 
approach for RFID security. In this book chapter, we have enhanced the first unconditional 
secure RFID protocol to satisfy untraceability. Our future work is to further analyze and 
improve the security of unconditional secure RFID protocols.  
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